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affecting the normal functioning of organizations causing billions of dollars of losses. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
A. VULNERABILITIES  
The widespread usage of Internet and networking, whilst increasing the 
productivity, efficiency and knowledge sharing has resulted in additional problems in the 
hands of the computer security personnel. The increase in the vulnerability of the systems 
connected to the Internet is not only due to the fact that more systems are available for 
the attack, but also due to the fact that more systems are available from which the attack 
could be carried out. Also, the advancement in technology has provided sophisticated 
attack tools, which can be used even by people not having much competence. Hence, a 
day probably does not pass without some sort of compromise in the private networks.  
Even though each operating system usually comes with their own 
implementations of Discretionary and/or Mandatory access control mechanisms, 
experience has shown that intruders have often been able to compromise these systems 
due to a variety of reasons, the most common being human related. Also, available are 
third party software that sit on top of the system kernel and monitor the system activity, 
looking for the specific security policy violations. The degree of protection that exists on 
any given host depends on how much time and effort has been put into applying these 
mechanisms. Often times, this requires much more time and effort than is desired by the 
various system administrators and many systems are left in a quite open and extremely 
vulnerable state. Also, many of these security mechanism have a significant effect on the 
performance of a system and thus may not be used for this reason as well. Additional 
layers of security are needed for the protection and so products like the Intrusion 
2 
Detection Systems (IDS), Firewalls and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are being used 
by a lot of companies in response to the new threats.  
Whilst big corporations do have a dedicated security staff to take care of the 
security aspect, a large number of computers connected to the Internet at any time are 
those of a common man who is largely ignorant of all these security aspects. With the 
falling prices of obtaining a Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) connection or a cable modem 
connection, more and more such people are having these high-speed connections with the 
end result that these computers form very lucrative targets for any hacker.    
B.  DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS 
Even though much progress has been made in the field of computer security, new 
threats seem to be developing for the network. Some of the new threats have focused on 
the Denial of Service (DoS), which is characterized by an explicit attempt by an attacker 
to prevent legitimate users of a service from using the desired resources. Examples of 
DoS attack include attempting to “flood” a network thereby preventing legitimate traffic, 
attempts to disrupt connections between two machines thereby preventing access to a 
service, attempts to prevent a particular individual from accessing a service and attempts 
to disrupt service to a specific system or person.  
In fact, a new variety of DoS attack called the Distributed Denial Of Service 
attack (DDoS) has been found to be increasing. The DDoS attack is a DoS attack 
multiplied by the number of attackers. These attacks first shot into prominence when 
major sites like Yahoo, Amazon.com, CNN.com and others were targeted in February 
2000. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has also indicated that most of the new threats 
would be of the nature of DDoS attacks [NIPC-00]. The losses caused by DDoS attacks 
3 
are tremendous especially to e-commerce sites. According to Jupiter Communications, 
46% of consumers report that poor site performance drove them away from their 
preferred sites. Unacceptable download times often caused by DDoS are estimated to 
have caused losses of up to $4.35 billion in U.S. e-commerce sales in 1999. And 
worldwide businesses experienced about 3.3% of unplanned downtime in 1999, 
translating to $1.6 trillion in lost revenue [EHAT-00].  
One of the reasons for the increase in these new types of attacks is as mentioned 
earlier, the ease of availability of low cost, high speed Internet access to the common man 
who is not very well-versed with the aspects of computer security. On the technical side, 
the reason for these attacks is the inherent trusting nature of the Internet. The Internet 
protocols were not designed with security in mind, and most of the authentication is 
based on the IP address, which as is well known, can be easily spoofed. 
C. SECURITY MANAGEMENT WITH NETWORK MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM  
More and more computer systems are being networked, and distributed 
processing is increasing in importance. Within a given organization, the trend is towards 
larger, more complex networks supporting more applications and more users. As these 
networks grow in scale, it becomes increasingly difficult to manage them by human effort 
alone. The complexity of such a system necessitates the use of automated network 
management tools. Also, since the network of most of the organizations includes 
equipment from multiple vendors, managing such networks without the aid of such 
network management tools is nearly impossible.  
As networked installations become larger, more complex and more 
heterogeneous, the cost of network management rises. Therefore, most of the big 
4 
corporations have some sort of a Network Management System (NMS) in place. A NMS 
has five major functional areas, Fault Management, Accounting Management, 
Configuration and Name Management, Performance Management and Security 
Management. Because of the ever increasing nature of the security attacks and threat, 
Security Management (SM) is of growing interest in industry and research. Four general 
methods are used in the SM:  
· Scanning a network to determine known security loopholes in a network. 
· On-line monitoring of the network to detect any suspicious events. 
· Data encryption and secure passwords. 
· Firewalls and perimeter defense. 
Since the Network Management System (NMS) is so widely used it would be a 
good idea if it could be used for detecting and preventing DDoS attacks. NMS uses the 
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) to carry out online monitoring of the 
network to be able to manage it. This thesis looked into the aspect whether this online 
monitoring of the network by NMS could give an indication of a Distributed Denial of 
Service Attack (DDoS). In other words, this thesis tried to answer the question whether 
and if yes, how could a Network Management System be used for detecting a DDoS 
attack? Specifically, the thesis studied the changes in the various Management 
Information Base (MIB) variables, which could be used for detection the DDOS attacks. 
Whilst the thesis did not offer any methodology of response to the attempted Security 
Violation, it is however expected that the NMS will also coordinate the response to the 
attack. This could be an area for future work. 
5 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II discusses the Network 
Management Systems domain and also goes into the details of the nature of distributed 
denial of service attacks. Chapter III gives a description of some of the work carried out 
by the researchers in the related area of detecting/preventing the DDoS attacks. Chapter 
IV details the experiments carried out for studying the various MIB variables which  a 
network management system would have to observe for detecting a distributed denial of 
service attack. Chapter V discusses the results. Chapter VI offers some conclusive 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
7 
II. APPLICATION DOMAIN  
 
A. NETWORK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS  
Network and distributed processing systems are of growing importance and have 
become critical in many areas of our life. Within a given organization, the trend is 
towards larger, more complex networks supporting more applications and more users. As 
these networks grow in scale, there are more chances of things going wrong, disabling the 
network or a portion of the network or degrading performance to an unacceptable level.  
A large network cannot be put together and managed by human effort alone. The 
complexity of such a system necessitates the use of automated network management 
tools. A Network Management System (NMS) is a collection of tools for network 
monitoring and control that is integrated in the following senses [STALL]. 
· It is a single operator interface with a powerful but user- friendly set of 
commands for performing most or all network management tasks. 
· A minimal amount of separate equipment is necessary. That is, most of the 
hardware and software required for network management is incorporated into 
the existing user equipment. 
A NMS allows network managers to view the entire network as a unified 
architecture, with addresses and labels assigned to each point and the specific attributes 
of each element and link known to the system. It consists of two active entities, the 
management station and the management agent. The management station is typically a 
stand-alone device and serves as the interface for the human network manager into the 
network management system. At a minimum a management station has a set of 
8 
management applications for data analysis, fault recovery, and so on. It also has the 
capability of translating the network manager’s requirement into the actual monitoring 
and control of elements in the network. 
The other active element in the network management system is the management 
agent. Key platforms such as hosts, bridges, routers, and hubs, may be equipped with the 
management agents so that they may be managed from the management station. The 
management agent responds to requests for information and actions from a management 
station and may asynchronously provide the management station with important but 
unsolicited information. 
 The management station and agents are linked by a network management 
protocol. The protocol used for the management of TCP/IP networks is the Simple 
Network Management Protocol (SNMP).  










































NMA  =  network management application 
NME  =  network management entity 
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A Network Management System performs the following five key functions: 
1. Fault Management   
A NMS maintains proper operation of a complex network by : 
· Determining exactly where the fault is. 
· Isolating the rest of the network from the failure so that it can continue to 
function without interference. 
· Reconfiguring or modifying the network in such a way as to minimize the 
impact of operation without the failed component or components. 
· Repairing or replacing the failed components  to restore the network to its 
initial state. 
2. Accounting Management 
A NMS allows a network manager to track the use of network resources by end 
user or end user class. This may be for a number of reasons, including the following: 
· An end user or group of end users may be abusing their access privileges and 
burdening the network at the expense of other end users. 
· End users may be making inefficient use of the network, and the network 
manager can assist in changing procedures to improve performance. 
· The network manager is in a better position to plan for network growth if end 
user activity is known in sufficient detail. 
· Hence, the NMS should be able to record and provide the accounting 
information as desired by the network manger.  
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3. Configuration And Name Management 
Configuration management is  concerned with initializing a network and 
gracefully shutting down part or all of the network. It is also concerned with maintaining, 
adding, and updating the relationships among components and the status of components 
themselves during network operation. When changes in configuration occur, end users 
should be notified of these changes. Configuration reports can be generated either on 
some routine periodic basis or in response to a request for such a report. Before 
reconfiguration, end users often want to inquire about the upcoming status of resources 
and their attributes. Network managers usually want only authorized end users 
(operators) to manage and control network operation. 
4. Performance Management 
Performance management of a computer network comprises two broad functional 
categories – monitoring and controlling. Monitoring is the function that tracks activities 
on the network. The controlling function enables performance management to make 
adjustments to improve network performance. Some of the performance issues of concern 
to the network manager are: 
· What is the level of capacity ut ilization? 
· Is there excessive traffic? 
· Has throughput been reduced to unacceptable levels? 
· Are there bottlenecks? 
· Is response time increasing? 
12 
Performance management, must therefore, monitor many resources to provide 
information in determining network operating level. By collecting this information, 
analyzing it, and then using the resultant analysis as feedback to the prescribed set of 
values, the network manger can become more adept at recognizing situations indicative 
of present or impending performance degradation. The NMS should be able to give the 
average and worst-case response times and the reliability of the network services. Thus, 
performance must be known in sufficient detail to assess specific end user queries. 
Performance statistics are used by the network managers to help them plan, manage and 
maintain large networks. Performance statistics can be used to recognize potential 
bottlenecks before they cause problems to the end users. Appropriate corrective action 
can then be taken. This action can take the form of changing routing tables to balance or 
redistribute traffic load during times of peak use or when a bottleneck is identified by a 
rapidly growing load in one area.  
5. Security Management 
Security management is concerned with managing information protection and 
access control facilities. These include generating, distributing, and storing encryption 
keys. Passwords, and other authorizations or access control information, must be 
maintained and distributed. Security management is also concerned with monitoring and 
controlling access to computer networks and access to all or part of the network 
management information obtained from the network nodes. Logs are an important 
security tool, and therefore, security management is very much involved with the 
collection, storage and examination of audit records and security logs, as well as with the 
enabling and disabling of these logging facilities. 
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Security Management keeps account of activity, or attempted activity, with these 
security objects in order to detect and recover from attempted or successful security 
attacks. This includes the following functions related to the maintenance of security 
information: 
· Event logging 
· Monitoring security audit trails 
· Monitoring usage and users of security-related resources 
· Reporting security violations 
· Receiving notification of security violations 
· Maintaining and examining security logs 
· Maintaining backup copies for all or part of the security-related files 
· Maintaining general network user profiles, and usage profiles for specific 
resources, to enable references for conformance to designated security profiles 
Security management manages the access-control service by maintaining general 
network user profiles and usage profiles for specific resources and by setting priorities for 
access. The security management function enables the user to create and delete security 
related objects, change their attributes or state, and affect the relationships between 
security objects. 
B. SNMP 
The network of most of the large organizations includes equipment from multiple 
vendors, and therefore, the need for network management tools that can be used across a 
14 
broad spectrum of product types, including end systems, bridges, routers, and 
telecommunications equipment increases. In response to this need, the simple network 
management protocol (SNMP) was developed to provide a tool for multi-vendor, 
interoperable network management [STALL]. SNMP includes the following key 
capabilities: 
· get - enables the management station to retrieve the value of objects at the 
agent. 
· set - enables the management station to set the value of objects at the agent. 
· trap - enables an agent to notify the management station of significant events. 
Resources in the network are managed by representing them as objects, which are 
essentially data variables that represent different aspects of the managed agent. This 
collection of objects is referred to as a Management Information Base (MIB). The MIB 
functions as a collection of access points at the agent for the management station. All of 
the values that are stored in the MIB are dynamic and are not stored in any file or registry 
key. The information stored in the MIBs ranges from Object IDs (OIDs) to Protocol Data 
Units (PDUs). The MIBs must be located at both the agent and the manager to work 
effectively.  
The MIB modules have been designed by the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) for the standard tracks and protocol suites. Each protocol suite contains many 
protocols, e.g., the Internet protocol suite contains the ICMP, UDP, TCP, RIP, OSPF, 
EGP, and BGP protocols. A manufacturer of an equipment can come out with his/her 
15 
own set of MIBs, but these need to be made available at the agent as well as at the NMS. 
The standard core management information is given in RFC1213.   
Information stored by agents is made available to the management system by 
means of the following two techniques: 
· Polling - Polling is a request-response interaction between a manager and 
agent. The manager can query any agent (for which it has authorization) and 
request the values of various information elements; the agent responds with 
information from its MIB. The request may be specific, listing one or more 
named variables. A request may also be in the nature of search, asking the 
agent to report information matching certain criteria, or to supply the manager 
with information about the structure of the MIB at the agent. A manager 
system may use polling to learn about the configuration it is managing, to 
obtain periodically an update of conditions, or to investigate an area in detail 
after being alerted to a problem.  
· Event Reporting -  With event reporting the initiative is with the agent, and the 
manager is in the role of a listener, waiting for incoming information. An 
agent may generate a report periodically (trap) to give the manager its current 
status. The reporting period may be pre-configured or set by the manager. An 
agent may also generate a report when a significant event (for example, a 
change of state) or an unusual event (for example, a fault) occurs. Event 
reporting is useful for detecting problems as soon as they occur. It is also 
more efficient than polling for monitoring objects whose states or values 
change relatively infrequently.  
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This thesis used only polling as a means to determine the changes taking place in 
the various variables in response to the DDoS attacks. However, there exists a possibility 
to modify the agents, to add some sort of intelligence in the agents, so as to raise a trap on 
seeing some sudden variation (as mentioned in conclusions and future works). 
C.      DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS  
A denial of service attack is characterized by an explicit attempt by an attacker to 
prevent legitimate users from using resources.  Examples of denial of service attacks 
include [STROT-00]: 
· attempts to “flood” a network, thereby preventing legitimate network traffic 
· attempts to disrupt connections between two machines, thereby preventing 
access to a service 
· attempts to prevent a particular individual from accessing a service 
· attempts to disrupt service to a specific system or person. 
A distributed format amplifies these attacks by adding a “many to one” dimension 
to these attacks, making them more difficult to prevent. A distributed denial of service 
attack is composed of four elements, as shown in the Figure 2 [BELL –00].  
· A victim - A victim is a target host that has been chosen to receive the brunt 
of the attack.  
· Attack daemons agents - These are the agent programs that actually conduct 
the attack on the target victim. Attack daemons are usually deployed in host 
computers (slaves or zombies). These daemons affect both the target and the 
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host computers. The task of deploying these attack daemons requires the 











  Figure 2.  Components Of A Distributed Denial Of Service Attack. “From 
Ref. [BELL - 00]”    
 
· Control master program - Its task is to coordinate the attack and is deployed in 
a host (master).  
· Real attacker - The mastermind behind the attack. By using a control master 
program, the real attacker can stay behind the scenes of the attack [LAU -00]. 
The DDOS attack sequence is as follows. 










· The control master program receives the “execute” message and propagates 
the command to the attack daemons under its control. 
· Upon receiving the attack command, the attack daemons begin the attack on 
the victim. 
Even though it might appear that the real attacker doesn’t have much to do except 
to send out the “execute” command, in reality he/she actually has to plan the execution of 
a successful distributed denial of service attack. The attacker must infiltrate all the host 
computers and networks where the daemon attackers are to be deployed. The attacker 
must study the target’s network topology and search for the bottlenecks and 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited during the attack. Because of the use of attack 
daemons and control master programs, the real attacker is not directly involved during the 
attack, which makes it difficult to trace who spawned the attack. 
1. Denial of Service Attack Methodology  
Some of the widely known basic denial of service attack methods that are 
employed are as follows [STROT - 00]. These attacks take advantage of the inherent 
flaws in the networking protocols.  
 a. Bonk Attack 
This attack takes advantage of the lack of bounds checking in the whole 
fragmentation and reassembly, by sending fragments with offsets that do not align.  This 
makes reassembly of all the packets impossible since the positions overlap. Certain 
operating systems do not handle this properly and will stop further communication until 
the system is restarted. 
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b.  Ping of Death Attack 
This attack is aimed at the ICMP echo request. ICMP is used with a small 
payload to provide a fast, low bandwidth test of connectivity. Because of this typical 
usage, some software do not handle large payloads. If such software receives an ICMP 
request packet with a payload greater than 4000 bytes the software generates an 
exception and halts communication on the network. 
c.  Smurf Attack/ Syn Flood 
In any TCP operation, before the handshake is complete, the receiver has 
no idea how long the propagation delay is between itself and the other machine. 
Therefore, once sending the ACK-SYN packet it will wait longer than usual (often up to 
2 minutes) to receive a response.  An attacker takes advantage of this and doesn’t respond 
to the ACK-SYN packets. Thus the receiver will have to store information necessary to 
correlate the expected ACK response with the packet sent. There is a limited amount of 
space storage so if enough packets are received, without any response to the ACK-SYN 
packets then this space will be exhausted and the machine will cease to receive any 
additional SYN request. Therefore, no valid connections can be made during this period.  
d.  UDP Flood 
This attack is based on UDP echo and character generator (chargen) 
services. Forged UDP packets are used to connect the ‘echo service’ on one machine to 
the ‘chargen service’ on the other machine. The result is that the two services consume all 
available network bandwidth between the machines as they exchange characters between 
themselves.  
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e. Land Attack 
In this case the source and the destination address are the same, and so the 
victim consumes all its resources talking to itself, and thereby blocks out side 
conversations.  
2. Distributed Denial of Service Attacks Methodology 
In this section the various methods employed by the attackers in the various 
distributed of denial service (DDoS) attacks are discussed [DITT -99], [DITT -00], 
[BARL-00]. 
a. Trinoo 
The communication between the master and the slaves is using TCP, 
whereas the communication with the attack daemons is using the UDP packets. The 
attack implemented is UDP flood. 
b. Tribe Flood Network (TFN) 
Communication between the master and the slaves  is using ICMP echo 
reply packets. The attack could be of smurf, SYN flood, UDP flood and ICMP flood 
attacks. 
c. TFN2K 
This is the newer version of the TFN attack and it uses TCP, UDP, ICMP 
or all three to communicate between the master and the slaves and the communication is 
encrypted. The attacks implemented are the same as TFN. 
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d. Stacheldracht 
It is based on the TFN attack. The communication between the master and 
the slave is encrypted and uses TCP and ICMP. In this case also the attacks implemented 
are the same as TFN. 
e. Shaft 
This attack is modeled after Trinoo. Communications between the master 
and the slave is achieved using the UDP packets  and the attack implemented is the UDP 
flood attack. An important feature of this attack is its ability to switch control master 
















































III. RELATED WORK  
 
The area of the distributed denial of service attacks has been the focus of much 
research. Much study has been done ranging from the analysis of the various common 
DDoS tools available to the simulation and proposals for solving the problems. Solutions 
to DDoS are especially difficult because of the ability of the DDoS tools to spoof the IP 
address and/or the port numbers. The usage of cryptography in the attack further 
complicates the issues. In fact, many experts have stated that there are currently no 
successful defenses against a fully distributed denial of service attack. Nevertheless some 
of these works are discussed here, which propose some of the actions we can take to 
minimize the impact of the DDoS attacks. 
A. IMPROVING ROUTING ALGORITHMS  
Changing/improving the routing algorithms in the routers has been proposed to 
minimize the impact of the DDoS attacks. Felix Lau et al. simulated a DDoS attack using 
ns-2 simulator (a discrete event simulator used for networking research and simulation of 
TCP, routing, and multicast protocols over wired and wireless (local and satellite) 
networks) and studied the performance of various routing algorithms during an attack in a 
network router. They have found that the routing algorithms like Drop tail, Fair queuing, 
Stochastic Fair queuing and Deficit Round Robin provide no bandwidth to the legitimate 
user during the attack, while Class Based queuing and Random Early Detection provides 
some limited bandwidth for certain classes of input flows. They have also found that 
implementing queuing algorithms in network routers may provide bandwidth to the users 
even in case of the DDoS attacks [LAU -00]. This approach however, doesn’t give any 
indication of the attacking sources.  
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B. IP TRACEBACK SCHEMES 
Some researchers have studied the methodology for tracing back the attacker. The 
basis of these studies is that the DDoS attacks are on the rise because of the difficulty in 
tracing back the attacking source. There have been many proposals to determine the 
attacking hosts in spite of usage of address spoofing techniques to disguise the source of 
origin. These proposals help determine the attacking hosts, not the actual attacker, 
because the attacker might be hiding in some other host and sends the attack command, 
much before the attack builds up. Some of these proposals are discussed below: 
1. Packet Based Trace Back 
In packet-based trace back, packets are marked with the addresses of intermediate 
routers. The victim can use the information inscribed in packets to trace the attack back to 
its source. The drawback of this method is the overhead resulting from the increase in the 
number of packets. 
2. ICMP Trace Back Messages (itrace) 
In this method the routers generate information packets – separate from the data 
packets – that convey analogous path information as ICMP trace back messages to the 
victim [BELL-00-M]. An itrace router probabilistically generates an authenticated copy 
of a packet, adds its own IP address as well as the IP of the previous and the next hop 
routers, and forwards the packet either to the source or the destination address. This 
approach does not need an upstream router map because the IP addresses of the routers 
are encoded in the itrace packets. The victim can use the information in the itrace packets 
to build an upstream router map. The main problem with this method also is the large 
overhead resulting from the additional data packets. 
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3. IP Trace Back using Probabilistic Packet Marking 
In this approach, the routers are allowed to probabilistically mark the packets with 
partial path information during packet forwarding. The victim can then reconstruct the 
complete path after receiving a modest number of packets containing the marking 
[SAVA-00]. This approach has low overhead for routers and supports incremental 
deployment, however it has a very high computation overhead for the victim to 
reconstruct the attack paths. Another problem with this approach is that it has mainly 
considered the denial-of-service with a single attacker site. The scheme becomes 
inefficient and gives inaccurate results even under a minor increase in scale.  
4. Advanced and Authenticated Marking Schemes for IP Trace Back 
Dawn Xiaodong Song and Adrian Perrig have proposed two new schemes, the 
Advanced Marking Scheme and the Authenticated Marking Scheme for tracing back the 
approximate origin of the spoofed IP packets.  This approach builds upon the previous 
approach to overcome its shortcomings. A new encoding scheme is used, whereby 
instead of the full IP address of a router, only its hash value is encoded. The schemes 
have low network and router overhead, and support incremental deployment. These 
schemes also result in lower computation overhead for the victim to reconstruct the attack 
paths under large-scale distributed denial-of-service attacks. Also, the authenticated 
marking scheme provides efficient authentication of routers’ markings such that even a 
compromised router cannot forge or tamper markings from other un-compromised routers 
[SONG - 01]. 
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C. INGRESS/ EGRESS FILTERING ( RFC 2267/2827) 
Ferguson and Senie proposed ingress filtering in which only valid IP packets from 
a valid source address are allowed by the routers to enter the Internet [FERG - 98]. 
Ingress traffic filtering at the periphery of Internet connected networks will reduce the 
effectiveness of source address spoofing denial of service attacks. The problem with this 
approach is that it requires the router to have sufficient power to verify the IP address of 
each packet and to have sufficient knowledge to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate addresses. Also, the approach is effective only if deployed at a large scale.  
Ingress filtering is basically from the viewpoint of the Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) or the administrators of the Autonomous systems. The same approach from a 
company’s internal networks view point is the egress filtering in which only valid IP 





















Figure 3. Ingress/Egress Filtering. 
 
D. TCP INTERCEPT 
Cisco has implemented a feature called TCP Intercept to protect TCP servers from 
TCP SYN – flooding attacks by intercepting and validating TCP connection requests 
[CISC -99].  It can be used in two modes. In the intercept mode, the TCP synchronization 
(SYN) packets from clients to servers are intercepted by the software and a connection 
established on behalf of the destination server. If the connection is successful then the 
software establishes the connection with the server on behalf of the client and knits the 
two half connections transparently. Thus connection attempts from unreachable hosts will 
never reach the server. The software continues to intercept and forward packets 
Internal Network 
ISP allows only valid 






allows only valid IP packets 
to exit – Egress filtering 
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throughout the duration of the connection. In the case of illegitimate requests, the 
software goes into aggressive timeout modes for the half connections.   
TCP intercept can also be used in watch mode, in which the software passively 
watches the connection requests flowing through the router. If a connection fails to get 
established in a configurable interval, the software intervenes and terminates the 
connection attempt.  
Thus, only the valid connection requests are allowed. Illegitimate requests and 
half-open connections are discarded by having timeouts or resets. When under attack, the 
TCP intercept feature becomes more aggressive in its protective behavior.  
E. PACKET FILTERING 
Packet filtering is a network security mechanism for controlling what data can 
flow to and from network affected routers or firewalls. A firewall is a system deployed 
between the company’s network and the Internet and has the ability to observe and 
control all the incoming/outgoing packets.  
A firewall can examine any packet moving between the internal network and the 
Internet or a firewall can be configured to serve as a proxy for communications. A 
firewall can limit the incoming network traffic from a particular source address thereby 
reducing the risk of an attack. However, since there is no guarantee that the source 
address is not spoofed, any filtering based on source address is subject to vulnerabilities.  
A firewall also provides no method of limiting valid traffic such that a machine is not 
simply overwhelmed with requests. But firewalls can block the type of traffic (protocols) 
and thus reduce the attack sets.   
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F. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) monitor the network for known attack 
signatures. An attack signature is a sequence of events, which is known to occur prior to 
or during an attack. IDS have been used to prevent some of the DDoS attacks, but they 
have their own limitations. There is no way of knowing the attack signature until at least 
one site has been attacked. Moreover, the attack signature based on the port number of 
the attack does not seem to be very effective in light of the new developments in the field 
of the DDoS tools, in which the port number as well as the protocols used are  random in 
nature. IDS, which observe traffic for attack signatures are known as knowledge-based 
systems.  
If the system has the ability to learn attack signatures, it is called a behavior based 
IDS. Problem with behavior-based systems is that to be effective the learning should be 
in real time, which is difficult to achieve. Another problem with behavior based ID 
systems is false positives reports. Whenever a system attempts to learn a behavior at the 
same time as guarding against the behavior it runs the risk of falsely identifying an 
occurrence. In most networks, the number of false positives must be sufficiently low so 
as not to disrupt normal communications.  
G. ROUTE-BASED DISTRIBUTED PACKET FILTERING 
In this approach, routing information is used to determine if a packet arriving at a 
router is valid with respect to its inscribed source/destination addresses, given the 
reachability constraints imposed by routing and network topology. With a partial 
coverage or deployment – about 20% in Internet Autonomous systems topologies – a 
significant fraction of the spoofed packet flows can be filtered and prevented from 
30 
reaching other autonomous systems. This approach doesn’t require expanding IP header 
fields to encode stamped link information [PARK-00]. However, it does require 
compliance by a number of different autonomous systems to be effective. 
H. THE NOZZLE 
E. Strother has presented a protection method called a nozzle [STROT-00]. The 
nozzle is based upon favorable aspects of firewalls and network pumps. It is to be 
deployed similar to the firewall such that all conversations from an un-trusted user to a 
critical resource are monitored. The main advantage of the nozzle is the ability to provide 
a threshold for trusted traffic thus precluding new attacks. A nozzle consists of a series of 
rings, each of which has a trusted and un-trusted buffer, rules for packet placement, and 
rules for communication with the next level. Rings are placed in the protocol stack so that 
they can protect particular protocols. Each ring looks into the irregularities in the 
incoming packet for that particular protocol layer. If there is no defect then the packets 
are allowed to pass through either to the next ring or to the destination, depending on the 






Figure 4.  The Nozzle. “From Ref. [STROT-00]” 
 
The nozzle’s performance is dependent on how it is configured.  
I. CENTERTRACK 
CenterTrack is an overlay network, consisting of IP tunnels, that is used to 
selectively reroute interesting datagrams directly from edge routers to special tracking 
routers. It requires input debugging and IP tunnel support on edge routers and special 
“CenterTrack” routers. The tracking routers can easily determine the ingress edge router 
by observing which tunnel the datagrams arrive on. The datagrams can be examined, then 
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
 
A. HYPOTHESIS 
Joao B.D. Cabrera, Lundy Lewis et al. proposed a methodology in which a 
Network Management System can be used for early detection of Distributed Denial of 
Service attacks [JOAO – 01]. Their hypothesis is that even though there are quite large 
number of events that are prior to an attack (e.g. suspicious logons, start of processes, 
addition of new files, sudden shifts in traffic, etc.), a DDoS attack could be detected on 
the basis of shifts in the traffic patterns in some of the Management Information Base 
(MIB) variables collected from the systems participating in the attack. Using domain 
knowledge an experiment was carried out and it was observed by them that there are 
indeed MIB-based precursors of DDoS attacks, that makes it possible to detect the attack 
before the target is shut down. They have also described how the relevant MIB variables 
at the attacker can be extracted automatically using Statistical tests for Causality. That is, 
out of the various variables at the target and the attacker, which change over a period of 
time, during a DDoS attack, the main variables which need to be monitored at the 
attacker can be determined, which can then be used for detecting in advance, any 
machine participating in the attack, using a simple anomaly detection scheme of the rate 
of change of these key variables.     
B. AIM 
This thesis was phase two of the experiments suggested above. In phase one 
above, the MIB variables to be studied were determined by the domain knowledge of the 
various attacks. The phase three of the experiments would be to actually conduct attacks 
over two different geographical locations. The aim of this thesis was to actually test all 
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the MIB variables, which change over a period of time during the DDoS attack in an 
experimental test bed and determine the key MIB variables, which should be observed for 
monitoring.  
An offshoot of this experiment would also be to determine if the type of DDOS 
attack could be identified by the observed type of the changes in the MIB variables (e.g. 
if it is DOS SYN flood, or UDP flood etc.) so that a possibility exists of an entirely 
automated procedure centered on Network Management systems for detecting precursors 
of Distributed Denial of Service Attacks, and responding to them. 
C. TESTBED  
The experimental setup for the test bed consisted of a local area network as shown 
in Figure 5. 
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The Network Management system used was the Spectrum Network Management 
system, manufactured by M/S Aprisma Technologies limited. The Operating system was 
the Sun Solaris 7.0. Two Red Hat Linux hosts were used as attackers and the target was 
the Windows 2000 professional system. The third Red Hat Linux host had the various 
programs and was used to observe the MIB variables. 
The attacking hosts were inserted with the DDoS zombie codes. In reality, before 
carrying out the attack, the attacker would have to impregnate the attackers with the 
zombie code and then from a master computer would give a command to attack the 
target. However in this thesis the attacking hosts were assumed to have been infected 
already and the master computer (needed for some attacks for giving a command) was 
external to the setup. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
1. Using the Spectrum Network Management System 
In the first approach the idea was to use the Spectrum Network Management 
System to observe the deviant variations in the various MIB variables. The java based 
MIB browser (which comes as a part of the Spectrum package) was used to browse the 
values of the various MIB variables during the duration of different attacks to shortlist the 
variables which undergo even a slightest change for each of the attacks. Thereafter, the 
target was polled for the value of each of the MIB variable but, it was observed that the 
NMS had the limitation of being able to poll at the time intervals of greater than or equal 
to 30 seconds. This was considered inadequate for getting the clear picture of the 
variation in the MIB variables and so the second approach of using a program 
‘miblogger.c’ was resorted to.  
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2. Using the program ‘miblogger.c’ 
 
In the second approach, a program miblogger.c was written using the ucd-snmp 
development library available with the Red Hat Linux and compiled and run on the same 
platform (the third Linux box, different from the two attackers). The list of MIBs to be 
queried was taken from the shortlist obtained from the first approach. The program 
queried the attackers and the target for the value of these MIBs at a regular interval of 
five seconds. The system time and the response obtained were recorded in a separate log 
file for each host (but containing all the shortlisted MIBs). Perl scripts were used to 
separate the logged MIBs into separate log files and to create the Round-Robin-Databases 
(RRDs) using the RRD perl module.  The graphing function of the RRDtool was used to 
generate the graphs.  
E. ROUND ROBIN DATABASE 
Round Robin Database (RRD) [TOBI-00] is a system to store and display time-
series data (i.e. network bandwidth, machine-room temperature, server load average). It 
stores the data in a very compact way that will not expand over time, and it presents 
useful graphs by processing the data to enforce a certain data density. It can be used 
either via simple wrapper scripts (from shell or Perl) or via frontends that poll network 
devices and put a friendly user interface on it. 
RRDtool refers to the Round Robin Database tool. Round robin is a technique that 
works with a fixed amount of data, and a pointer to the current element. When the current 
data is read or written, the pointer moves to the next element. Since the database is in the 
form of a circular record file, there is neither beginning nor an end, one can go on and on. 
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After a while, when all the available places are used, the process automatically reuses old 
locations. This way, the database does not grow in size and therefore requires no 
maintenance. RRDtool works with Round Robin Databases (RRDs). It stores and 
retrieves data from them. 
On disk, the round robin database (RRD) is organized into sequential sections, 
called round robin archives (RRA). Within each RRA is a section for each of the data 
sources (input) stored in this RRD. Each RRA is defined by a consolidation function 
which maps primary data points (PDP) to consolidated data points (CDP), which are then 
plotted. The consolidation function could be the MAX, MIN, LAST or AVERAGE of the 
values. 
In this thesis the RRDtool is used for generating the RRD databases, updating 
them with the logged data and for creating graphs in the ‘gif’ format.  The RRD perl 
module and simple perl scripts are used for this purpose.  
F. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROGRAMS 
1. Logging of MIB Variables Values  
The program used to collect and log the values of the MIB variables was 
‘miblogger.c’ in RedHat linux 7.0 (Kernel 2.2.16-22) and the GNU compiler gcc version 
2.96. The program uses the UCD-SNMP library (also known as NET-SNMP). The 
library is freely available and also comes with the standard Red-Hat installation.  
 Initially load the various header files.  
#include <ucd-snmp/ucd-snmp-config.h> 
#include <ucd-snmp/ucd-snmp-includes.h> 
#include <sys/time.h>    
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The polling interval is defined to be 5s and the total poll duration is for 20 
minutes (20 x 60 / 5). This is a reasonable interval since the DDoS attacks result in very 
sudden large changes in the MIB variables.  
#define POLL_INTERVAL  5 
#define POLL_COUNT  240   
 
A list of hosts and their type (whether target or attacker) is declared and 
populated. The type is required because the MIB variables to be observed for the attacker 
and the target are different. The list of the MIB variables to be observed for both the type 
of hosts was determined by both the domain knowledge of the attacks as well as by 
observing them with a MIB browser when under attack.  
struct host { char *name; char *type; }  
struct oid { char *Name; oid Oid[MAX_OID_LEN]; int OidLen;  
 
The main() routine first calls the initialize() subroutine which initializes the snmp 
library. It also reads the various MIB variables and correlates them with their oid number, 




 while (op->Name) { 
   op->OidLen = sizeof(op->Oid)/sizeof(op->Oid[0]); 
      if (!read_objid(op->Name, op->Oid, &op->OidLen)) { 
         snmp_perror("read_objid"); 
         exit(1); 
  }  
 } 
  
The hosts are then polled ‘POLL_COUNT’ times, at ‘POLL_INTERVAL’ 
duration. The poll() subroutine initially declares the following variables: 
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· struct snmp_session – A structure that holds information about the host which 
is to be queried. Two of these structures need to be declared, one to fill with 
information and the second a pointer returned by the library.  
· struct snmp_pdu – This structure holds all of the information that is sent 
(received) to (from) the remote host.  
· struct oid – The pointer for the oid. Could be oid_T (target) or oid_A 
(attacker). 
· FILE *f – The log file. The log file is different for each host.  
The snmp-session is then initialized which prepares the input session data. The 
first call to snmp_sess_init() initializes the Library, including the MIB parse trees, before 
any SNMP sessions are created. The structure is populated with the snmp version type 
(v1, v2c, v3 – v2c is used in the program as it is the most common one and has wide 
spread support), the name of the host and the snmp community name) and a session is 
then setup with the call snmp_synch_setup(). 
 snmp_sess_init(&ss);    
 ss.version = SNMP_VERSION_2c; 
 ss.peername = hp->name; 
 ss.community = "public"; 
 snmp_synch_setup(&ss); 
After establishing a session, it is opened. Opening it returns a pointer to another 
session that is used in all the future calls. 
sp = snmp_open(&ss) 
Next, a Protocol Data Unit (PDU) is created which is sent to the remote host for 
requesting the information needed. The PDU created is SNMP_PDU which retrieves a 
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value for each of the specified oid. A NULL value needs to be added to each oid for all 
outgoing requests. This is achieved by the  
snmp_add_null_var(req, op->Oid, op->OidLen); 
Finally, the request is sent using the session pointer and the pdu. A status and a 
response is returned which is stored in the second snmp_pdu (*resp) structure declared 
earlier. 
status = snmp_synch_response(sp, req, &resp); 
The returned response, status, session pointer and the log file name are then 
passed to the log_response() subroutine for logging purpose. The returned values are 
logged only if there is no error (status = STAT_SUCCESS and response-> == 
SNMP_ERR_NOERROR). A new line is added to the log files after recording the group 
of MIB values at a particular time, to facilitate the parsing of the log files easily. 
2. Separating the MIB Time Series 
The initial log files for the two attackers and the target contains the MIB values 
logged over a period of time, with the latest time and the corresponding MIB value at the 
beginning of the file. Two short perl scripts are used for this purpose. The first perl script 
‘reverse.pl’ is for reversing the order of the logged data. This is required for creating the 
RRD database. The RRD database functions only if the ordering of data values is in the 
increasing order of the logged time i.e. the value recorded first should be at the beginning 
of the file.  
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The script reverse.pl takes the log file and creates another file in which the data is 
in the reverse order. The second script is given this reversed log file as the input and it 
splits it into the various MIB values recorded in the log file. 
Open the log file first: 
 
open(LOG,"<$file") or die "could not open file"; 
 
Go through the file and determine the number of MIB variables in the log file, the 
group of MIB variables is separated in the log file by a new line character. The script 
looks for the first character in the line and if it is the new-line character then it exits the 
loop. 
while(<LOG>) { 
 if ($_ !~ /^\n/){ 
  chomp; 
  ($time,$ipadd,$mib_n_value) = split /:/; 
  print "min_n_value = $mib_n_value\n"; 
  ($mib,$count) = split / = /, $mib_n_value; 
  ($f,$m,$l) = split /\./, $mib; 
  print "The value of log file name is $m.log\n"; 
  sleep 1; 
  $array[$no] = $m.".log"; 
  print "The value of $no element in array is $array[$no]\n"; 
  $no++; 
 } 
        else {last;} 
} 
close(LOG); 
$max_no_of_mibs = $no; 
 
Determine the names of the MIB variables logged in the file and then create 
corresponding log files for each of them.  
for ($x = 1; $x <= $max_no_of_mibs; $x++) { 
open(OUT."$x", ">". $array[$x-1]) || die "couldn't open $x.log \n"; 
} 
$x = 1; 
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open(LOG,"<$file") or die "could not open file"; 
while(<LOG>) { 
 if ($_ !~ /^\n/) { 
  chomp; 
  if ($x > $max_no_of_mibs) { $x = 1; } 
  ($time,$ipadd,$mib_n_value) = split /:/; 
  ($mib,$count) = split / = /, $mib_n_value; 
   
  print "Updating $x.log\n"; 
  $FH = OUT."$x"; 
  print $FH "$time:$count\n"; 






3. Plotting the MIB Time Series 
 
The time series for each of the MIB variable is plotted using the RRD tool 
described earlier. It requires the usage of the perl::RRD module. 





Open the log file and determine the start time and the end time of the logging. 
 




    ($time,$count) = split /:/; 
 if ($cnt <2) { $start_time = $time-10;} 






Create and update the round-robin database for each of the MIB variable and print 
error if any. 
 
RRDs::create ($fname.".rrd","--start",$start_time, " --step",5,  
  "DS:a:COUNTER:10:U:U", 
  "RRA:AVERAGE:0.5:1:600"); 
$ERROR = RRDs::error; 
die "$0: unable to create '$fname.'.rrd: $ERROR\n" if $ERROR; 
print "Updating $fname.rrd\n"; 
open(LOG,"<$file") or die "could not open file" ; 
while(<LOG>) { 
 chomp; 
 RRDs::update ($fname.".rrd", $_); 
 if ($ERROR = RRDs::error) { 





Draw the graphs in gif format. 
 
RRDs::graph ("$fname.gif"," --start", $start_time, "--end", $end_time,"--title", 
"TFN_Syn_Flood - Rate of change of $fname with time",  "--vertical-label", 
"$fname(/s)","DEF:mibvalue=$fname.rrd:a:AVERAGE",             
"LINE1:mibvalue#FF0000:\rAverage change in $fname per second");  
if ($ERROR = RRDs::error) { 
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This chapter describes the results of the experiments carried out on the 
experimental setup. The results identify the affected MIB variables at the attackers and at 
the target for each of the DDoS attack and also graphically illustrate the change in these 
before during and after attack. The key variables (those which show large changes) are 
highlighted. The attacks considered in the experiment were the Trinoo, TFN and the 
TFN2K attacks. The graphical results clearly indicate the sudden abrupt change in the 
key MIB variables during the attack. 
A. TRINOO 
The affected variables at the target and at the attacker in a trinoo attack are shown 
in table 1.  
 
Sl. No. Target Attacker 
1. icmp.icmpOutDestUnreachs.0  icmp.icmpInDestUnreachs.0 
2. icmp.icmpOutMsgs.0 icmp.icmpInMsgs.0 
3. ip.ipInDelivers.0 ip.ipInDelivers.0 
4. ip.ipInReceives.0  ip.ipInReceives.0 
5. ip.ipOutRequests.0 ip.ipOutRequests.0  
6. udp.udpInDatagrams.0 udp.udpInDatagrams.0   
7. udp.udpNoPorts.0 udp.udpOutDatagrams.0  
8. udp.udpOutDatagrams.0  
 










1. Changes in the Target MIB Variables  
Figure 6 shows the average changes in the target MIB variables per five-second 













2. Changes in the Attacker1 MIB Variables  
Figure 7 shows the average change in the attacker1 MIB variables per five-second 
interval in case of a trinoo attack. 
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Figure 7. Trinoo Attack - Changes In Attacker1 MIB Variables. 
 
3. Changes in the Attacker2 MIB Variables 
Figure 8 shows the average change in the attacker2 MIB variables per five-second 




Figure 8. Trinoo Attack - Changes In Attacker2 MIB Variables. 
 
B. TFN 
1. Ping (ICMP) Flood 
The affected variables at the target and at the attacker in a TFN ping-flood attack 
are shown in table 2.  
Sl. No. Target Attacker 
1. icmp.icmpInEchoReps.0 icmp.icmpInEchoReps.0  
2. icmp.icmpInEchos.0 icmp.icmpInMsgs.0 
3. icmp.icmpInErrors.0 ip.ipOutRequests.0 
4. icmp.icmpInMsgs.0  
5. icmp.icmpOutEchoReps.0  
6. icmp.icmpOutMsgs.0  
7. ip.ipInDelivers.0  
8. ip.ipInReceives.0  
9. ip.ipOutRequests.0  
10. udp.udpNoPorts.0  
 
Table 2. Affected MIB Variables In TFN Ping Flood Attack. 
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a. Changes in the Target MIB Variables 
Figure 9 below shows the average change in the target MIB variables per 





Figure 9. TFN Ping Flood Attack - Changes In Target MIB Variables. 
 
b. Changes in the Attacker-1 MIB Variables 
Figure 10 shows the average changes in the attacker1 MIB variables per 




Figure 10. TFN Ping Flood Attack - Changes In Attacker1 MIB Variables. 
 
c. Changes in the Attacker-2 MIB Variables 
Figure 11 shows the average changes in the attacker2 MIB variables per 





Figure 11. TFN Ping Flood Attack - Changes In Attacker2 MIB Variables. 
 
2. SYN Flood 
The affected variables at the target and at the attacker in a TFN syn-flood attack 
are shown in table 3. 
Sl. No. Target Attacker 
1. ip.ipInDelivers.0 icmp.icmpInEchoReps.0  
2. ip.ipInReceives.0 icmp.icmpInMsgs.0 
3. tcp.tcpInErrs.0 ip.ipOutRequests.0 
4. tcp.tcpInSegs.0  
 
Table 3. Affected MIB Variables In TFN Syn Flood Attack. 
 
 
a. Changes in the Target MIB Variables 
Figure 12 below shows the average change in the target MIB variables per 




Figure 12. TFN Syn Flood Attack - Changes In Target MIB Variables. 
 
b. Changes in the Attacker-1 MIB Variables 
Figure 13 shows the average changes in the attacker1 MIB variables per 
five-second interval when under a TFN syn-flood attack. 
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Figure 13. TFN Syn Flood Attack - Changes In Attacker1 MIB Variables. 
 
c. Changes in the Attacker-2 MIB Variables 
Figure 14 shows the average changes in the attacker2 MIB variables per 
five-second interval when under a TFN syn-flood attack. 
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Figure 14. TFN Syn Flood Attack - Changes In Attacker2 MIB Variables. 
 
3. UDP Flood 
 
The affected variables at the target and at the attacker in a TFN UDP-Flood attack 
are shown in table 4. 
 
Sl. No. Target Attacker 
   
1. icmp.icmpInDestUnreachs.0 icmp.icmpInEchoReps.0  
2. icmp.icmpInMsgs.0 icmp.icmpInMsgs.0 
3. icmp.icmpOutDestUnreachs.0 ip.ipOutRequests.0 
4. icmp.icmpOutMsgs.0  
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5. ip.ipInDelivers.0   
6. ip.ipInReceives.0  
7. ip.ipOutRequests.0  
8. udp.udpInErrors.0  
9. udp.udpNoPorts.0  
 
Table 4. Affected MIB Variables In TFN UDP Flood Attack. 
 
a. Changes in the Target MIB variables 
Figure 15 below shows the average change in the target MIB variables per 





Figure 15. TFN UDP Flood Attack - Changes In Target MIB Variables. 
 
b. Changes in the Attacker-1 MIB Variables 
Figure 16 shows the average changes in the attacker1 MIB variables per 




Figure 16. TFN UDP Flood Attack - Changes In Attacker1 MIB Variables. 
 
c. Changes in the Attacker-2 MIB Variables 
Figure 17 shows the average changes in the attacker2 MIB variables per 








1. Ping Flood 
The affected variables at the target and at the attacker in a TFN2K ping-flood 
attack are shown in table 5. 
Sl. No. Target Attacker 
1. icmp.icmpInEchoReps.0 icmp.icmpInEchoReps.0 
2. icmp.icmpInEchos.0 icmp.icmpInMsgs.0 
3. icmp.icmpInErrors.0 ip.ipInDelivers.0 
4. icmp.icmpInMsgs.0 ip.ipInReceives.0 
5. icmp.icmpOutEchoReps.0 ip.ipOutRequests.0  
6. icmp.icmpOutMsgs.0 tcp.tcpInSegs.0 
7. ip.ipInDelivers.0 udp.udpInErrors.0 
8. ip.ipInReceives.0  
9. ip.ipOutRequests.0  
10. udp.udpNoPorts.0  
 
Table 5. Affected MIB Variables In TFN2K Ping Flood Attack. 
 
a. Changes in the Target MIB Variables 
Figure 18 below shows the average change in the target MIB variables per 






Figure 18. TFN2K Ping Flood Attack - Changes In Target MIB Variables. 
  
b. Changes in the Attacker-1 MIB Variables 
Figure 19 shows the average changes in the attacker1 MIB variables per 






Figure 19. TFN2K Ping Flood Attack - Changes In Attacker1 MIB Variables. 
 
c. Changes in the Attacker-2 MIB Variables 
Figure 20 shows the average changes in the attacker2 MIB variables per 





Figure 20. TFN2K Ping Flood Attack - Changes In Attacker2 MIB Variables. 
 
2. SYN Flood 
The affected variables at the target and at the attacker in a TFN2K syn-flood 
attack are shown in table 6. 
 
Sl. No. Target Attacker 
1. ip.ipInDelivers.0 icmp.icmpInEchoReps.0 
2. ip.ipInReceives.0 icmp.icmpInMsgs.0 
3. ip.ipOutRequests.0 ip.ipInReceives.0  
4. tcp.tcpInSegs.0  ip.ipInDelivers.0  
5. tcp.tcpInErrs.0  ip.ipOutRequests.0  
6. tcp.tcpOutRsts.0  tcp.tcpInSegs.0 
7. tcp.tcpOutSegs.0  udp.udpInErrors.0 
 




a. Changes in the Target MIB Variables 
Figure 21 below shows the average change in the target MIB variables per 




Figure 21. TFN2K Syn Flood Attack - Changes In Target MIB Variables. 
 
b. Changes in the Attacker-1 MIB Variables 
Figure 22 shows the average changes in the attacker1 MIB variables per 





Figure 22. TFN2K Syn Flood Attack - Changes In Attacker1 MIB Variables. 
 
c. Changes in the Attacker-2 MIB Variables 
Figure 13 shows the average changes in the attacker2 MIB variables per 





Figure 23. TFN2K Syn Flood Attack - Changes In Attacker2 MIB Variables. 
 
3. UDP Flood 
The affected variables at the target and at the attacker in a TFN2K UDP-Flood 
attack are shown in table 7. 
 
Sl. No. Target Attacker 
1. icmp.icmpOutDestUnreachs.0 icmp.icmpInEchoReps.0 
2. icmp.icmpOutMsgs.0 icmp.icmpInMsgs.0 
3. ip.ipInDelivers.0 ip.ipInReceives.0  
4. ip.ipInReceives.0 ip.ipInDelivers.0  
5. ip.ipOutRequests.0 ip.ipOutRequests.0  
6. udp.udpInErrors.0 tcp.tcpInSegs.0 
7. udp.udpNoPorts.0 udp.udpInErrors.0 
 





a. Changes in the Target MIB Variables 
Figure 24 below shows the average change in the target MIB variables per 
five-second interval for a TFN2K UDP-flood attack. 
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Figure 24. TFN2K UDP Flood Attack - Changes In Target MIB Variables. 
 
b. Changes in the Attacker-1 MIB Variables 
Figure 25 shows the average changes in the attacker1 MIB variables per 




Figure 25. TFN2K UDP Flood Attack - Changes In Attacker1 MIB Variables. 
 
c. Changes in the Attacker-2 MIB Variables 
Figure 26 shows the average changes in the attacker2 MIB variables per 





Figure 26. TFN2K UDP Flood Attack - Changes In Attacker2 MIB Variables. 
 
 
4. Targa Flood 
The affected variables at the target and at the attacker in a TFN2K Targa-Flood 
attack are shown in table 8. 
 
 
Sl. No. Target Attacker 
1. icmp.icmpInDestUnreachs.0  icmp.icmpInEchoReps.0 
2. icmp.icmpInErrors.0 icmp.icmpInMsgs.0 
3. icmp.icmpInMsgs.0  ip.ipInDelivers.0 
4. icmp.icmpOutDestUnreachs.0 ip.ipInReceives.0 
5. icmp.icmpOutMsgs.0  ip.ipOutRequests.0 
6. ip.ipInDelivers.0 tcp.tcpInSegs.0 
7. ip.ipInReceives.0 udp.udpInErrors.0 
8. ip.ipInUnknownProtos.0 udp.udpOutDatagrams.0 
9. ip.ipOutRequests.0  
10. ip.ipReasmFails.0  
11. ip.ipReasmReqds.0  
12. tcp.tcpInErrs.0  
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13. tcp.tcpInSegs.0  
14. udp.udpInErrors.0  
15. udp.udpNoPorts.0  
16. udp.udpOutDatagrams.0  
 




a. Changes in the Target MIB Variables 
Figure 27 below shows the average change in the target MIB variables per 






Figure 27. TFN2K Targa Flood Attack - Changes in Target MIB Variables. 
 
b. Changes in the Attacker-1 MIB Variables 
Figure 28 below shows the average change in the attacker1 MIB variables 





Figure 28. TFN2K Targa Flood Attack - Changes in Attacker1 MIB Variables. 
 
c. Changes in the Attacker-2 MIB Variables 
Figure 29 below shows the average change in the attacker2 MIB variables 





Figure 29. TFN2K Targa Flood Attack - Changes in Attacker2 MIB Vvariables. 
 
5. Mix Flood 
The affected variables at the target and at the attacker in a TFN2K mix-flood 
attack are shown in table 9. 
Sl. No. Target Attacker 
1. icmp.icmpInEchoReps.0 icmp.icmpInEchoReps.0 
2. icmp.icmpInEchos.0 icmp.icmpInMsgs.0 
3. icmp.icmpInErrors.0 ip.ipInDelivers.0 
4. icmp.icmpInMsgs.0 ip.ipInReceives.0 
5. icmp.icmpOutDestUnreachs.0 ip.ipOutRequests.0  
6. icmp.icmpOutEchoReps.0 tcp.tcpInSegs.0 
7. icmp.icmpOutMsgs.0 udp.udpInErrors.0   
8. ip.ipInDelivers.0  
9. ip.ipInReceives.0  
10. ip.ipOutRequests.0  
11. tcp.tcpInErrs.0  
12. tcp.tcpInSegs.0  
13. tcp.tcpOutRsts.0  
14. tcp.tcpOutSegs.0  
15. udp.udpNoPorts.0   
16. udp.udpInErrors.0   
 
Table 9. Affected MIB Variables In TFN2K Mix Flood Attack. 
 
a. Changes in the Target MIB Variables 
Figure 30 below shows the average change in the target MIB variables per 






Figure 30. TFN2K Mix Flood Attack - Changes in Target MIB Variables. 
 
b. Changes in the Attacker-1 MIB Variables 
Figure 31 below shows the average change in the attacker1 MIB variables 






Figure 31. TFN2K Mix Flood Attack - Changes in Attacker1 MIB Variables. 
 
c. Changes in the Attacker-2 MIB Variables 
Figure 32 below shows the average change in the attacker2 MIB variables 





Figure 32. TFN2K Mix Flood Attack - Changes in Attacker2 MIB Variables. 
 
D.  SUMMARY  
The summary of the various MIB variables affected, is given in the Table 10 for 
the attackers and in Table 11 for the targets for different attacks. 
 
Sl  MIB Tri
noo 
TFN TFN2K 
   Ping Syn UDP Ping Syn  UDP Targa Mix 
           
 ICMP          
1. icmpInDestUnreachs    XX    XX  
2. icmpInEchoReps  X   X    X 
3. icmpInEchos  XX   XX    XX 
4. icmpInErrors  X   XX   XX XX 
5. icmpInMsgs  XX  XX XX   XX XX 
6. icmpOutDestUnreachs XX   XX   X XX XX 
7. icmpOutEchoReps  XX   XX    XX 
8. icmpOutMsgs XX XX  XX XX  X XX XX 
           
 IP          
1. ipInDelivers XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX 
2. ipInReceives XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX 
3. ipInUnknownProtos        XX  
4. ipOutRequests XX XX  XX XX X X XX XX 
5. ipReasmFails        XX  
6. ipReasmReqds        XX  
           
 TCP          
1. tcpInErrs   XX   XX  X XX 
2. tcpInSegs   XX   XX  X XX 
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3. tcpOutRsts       XX   XX 
4. tcpOutSegs       XX   XX 
           
 UDP          
1. udpInDatagrams X         
2. udpInErrors    XX   XX X XX 
3. udpNoPorts XX X  XX XX  X XX X 
4. udpOutDatagrams X       X  
 
 X – Small Variation              XX – Large Variation 
 












   Ping Syn UDP Ping Syn UDP Targa Mix 
           
 ICMP          
1. icmpInDestUnreachs XX         
2. icmpInEchoReps  X X X X X X X X 
3. icmpInEchos          
4. icmpInErrors          
5. icmpInMsgs XX X X X X X X X X 
6. icmpOutDestUnreachs          
7. icmpOutEchoReps          
8. icmpOutMsgs          
           
 IP          
1. ipInDelivers X    X X X X X 
2. ipInReceives XX    X  X X X 
3. ipInUnknownProtos          
4. ipOutRequests XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX X
X 
5. ipReasmFails          
6. ipReasmReqds          
           
 TCP          
1. tcpInErrs          
2. tcpInSegs     X XX X X X 
3. tcpOutRsts           
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4. tcpOutSegs           
           
 UDP          
1. udpInDatagrams X         
2. udpInErrors     X X X X X 
3. udpNoPorts          
4. udpOutDatagrams XX       X  
 
X – Small Variation              XX – Large Variation 
 
Table 11. Summary Of Affected MIB Variables In Attackers In DDoS Attacks. 
 
The analyses of the result obtained shows that a large increase in the 
ip.ipInReceives.0 and ip.ipInDelivers.0 MIBs on a particular network device is a sure 
indication of it being attacked in a DDoS manner. On the other hand a large raise in the 
ip.ipOutRequests.0 MIB variable means that the system has been compromised and is a 
zombie participating in a DDoS/DoS attack against some other system. The monitoring 
system can further home on to the exact type of attack based on the signatures of the 
attacks as seen from the tables above.  
Another, important property as noticed from the graphs is that before the attacker 
commences the attack there are some minor changes in its MIB values. A mathematical 
correlation between these values and the attack carried out has been shown 
mathematically [JOAO-01]. This knowledge could be used to detect the DDoS attack 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis explored the usage of one commercial NMS (Spectrum) for observing 
the DDoS attacks. However this NMS can poll the hosts only at an interval greater than 
or equal to 30 seconds. Hence, it was found to be unsuitable for carrying out the 
experiments. The program using ucd-snmp library was used thereafter to log the 
variations in the various MIB variables and the results showed that there is indeed a large 
and sudden variation in the various SNMP MIB variables. These could be monitored by a 
NMS provided the sampling/querying time for the NMS is short enough to quickly detect 
the peak pattern usage.  
Even though a large number of MIB variables are affected in a DDoS attack this 
thesis identified the MIB variables of importance (Key variables). These key variables 
could be grouped together and monitored by the NMS for monitoring purpose so as to be 
better able to carry out its Security Management tasks.  Continuous monitoring of only 
these MIBs by a NMS is required for achieving the desired result. 
The thesis determined the key variables for not only the attacked systems but also 
the attacker systems. Thus, a possibility exists for using NMS for preventing the hosts 
within the network from taking part in attack against any external host, but the results 
clearly show that most of the variables on the attackers have a very small change for a 
short period of time and so the NMS will have to query the hosts at a shorter duration of 
time. However, this shorter polling time will result in increase in the traffic in the internal 
network and so a better alternative is to have intelligent SNMP agents which monitor the 
104 
normal variable  profile and on observing any deviation raise a trap for the NMS. A large 
number of such traps from a  number of hosts within the network will be a sure indicator 
of compromised hosts within the network. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Many areas remain for further research. Even though this thesis provided ample 
evidence of the variation in the MIB traffic, which could be used by the Network 
Management System, the actual automation of the NMS with the observed changes could 
be an area of active research.  
Another active area of research could be to actually determine the reactive action 
which could be taken to prevent the Distributed Denial of Service attacks or at the very 
least to minimize it. The NMS could trigger the firewall or any packet filter application to 
stop these renegade packets from entering its network.  
Going further ahead, as mentioned earlier, the SNMP agents in the host systems 
could be modified to have some sort of intelligence to continuously monitor these key 
variables and flag an alarm in case of any observed variation in their usage pattern. The 
alarm could be flagged by means of raising a trap.  A study could also be made to 












 * Program Name: miblogger.c 
 * Author:  Chandan Singh Negi 
 * Description:  A simple program to query a list of hosts for the value of  
 *    mib variables at regular time intervals 
 * Usage:   Compile and run without any command line parameters.  
 *    You will have to modify the mib variables and the host 
 *    addresses in the code.      
 * Platform:  RedHat Linux 7.0 – kernel 2.2.16-22 
 * Library:  ucd-snmp 






#include <sys/time.h>   // for finding the current time  
 




 *   A list of hosts and host-type to query 
 */ 
 
struct host { 
 char *name; 
 char *type; 
} hosts[] = { 
 {"209.60.77.20","ATTACKER"}, 
 { "209.60.77.24", "ATTACKER" }, 






 * A list of mib-variables to query the attacker and targets 
 */ 
 
struct oid { 
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 char *Name; 
 oid Oid[MAX_OID_LEN]; 
 int OidLen; 
} oids_T[] = { 
 { "udp.udpInDatagrams.0" }, 
 { "udp.udpOutDatagrams.0" }, 
 { "udp.udpNoPorts.0" }, 
 { "ip.ipInReceives.0" }, 
 { "ip.ipInDelivers.0" }, 
 { "ip.ipOutRequests.0"}, 
 { "icmpOutMsgs.0" }, 




struct oid oids_A[] = { 
 { "udp.udpInDatagrams.0" }, 
 { "udp.udpOutDatagrams.0" }, 
 { "ip.ipInReceives.0" }, 
 { "ip.ipInDelivers.0" }, 
 { "ip.ipOutRequests.0"}, 
 { "icmpInMsgs.0"}, 
 { "icmpInDestUnreachs.0" }, 







 * function:  void initialize(void) 
 * parameters:  none 
 * returns:  none 
 * description:  Reads the various mib variables and correlates them  
 *    with their oid number  
 */ 
 
void initialize (void) 
{ 
 int i; 
 struct oid *op; 
 init_snmp("miblogger"); 
  
 for(i=0; i<2; i++) { 
  switch(i) { 
   case 0: op = oids_T; 
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    break; 
   case 1: op = oids_A; 
  } // end switch 
  while (op->Name) { 
   op->OidLen = sizeof(op->Oid)/sizeof(op->Oid[0]); 
      if (!read_objid(op->Name, op->Oid, &op->OidLen)) { 
         snmp_perror("read_objid"); 
         exit(1); 
   } // end if 
  op++; 
  } // end while 
 } //  end for 






 * function:  int log_response (int status, struct snmp_session *sp, 
 *       struct snmp_pdu *pdu, FILE *f) 
 * parameters:  status - the status returned on querying the hosts. 
 *    *sp -  
 *    *pdu - pointer to the PDU returned by the host 
 *    *f - the file where the response is to be logged 
 * returns:  0 - if the response PDU from the queried host contained 
 *         error 
 *    1 - if no error, if there is timeout while querying host, 
 *          or if no specified host exists   
 * description:  logs the response returned by various hosts in their 
 *    respective log files  
 *      
 */ 
 
int log_response (int status, struct snmp_session *sp, struct snmp_pdu *pdu, FILE *f) 
{ 
 char buf[128]; 
 struct variable_list *vp; 
 int ix; 
 time_t now; 
 
 now = time(NULL); 
 
 fprintf(stdout, "Logging the results\n"); 
 fprintf(stdout, "%u:",now); 
        fprintf(f, "%u:",now); 
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 switch (status) { 
 case STAT_SUCCESS: 
  vp = pdu->variables; 
  if (pdu->errstat == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { 
   while (vp) { 
   sprint_variable(buf, vp->name, vp->name_length, vp); 
   fprintf(stdout, "%s: %s\n", sp->peername, buf); 
   fprintf(f, "%s: %s\n", sp->peername, buf); 
   vp = vp->next_variable; 
   } //while 
  } //if 
  else { 
for (ix = 1; vp && ix != pdu->errindex; vp = vp->next_variable,  ix++); 
   if (vp) sprint_objid(buf, vp->name, vp->name_length); 
   else strcpy(buf, "(none)"); 
   fprintf(stdout, "%s: %s: %s\n", 
          sp->peername, buf, snmp_errstring(pdu->errstat)); 
   fprintf(f, "%s: %s: %s\n", 
          sp->peername, buf, snmp_errstring(pdu->errstat)); 
  } //else 
  return 1; 
 case STAT_TIMEOUT: 
  fprintf(stdout, "%s: Timeout \n", sp->peername); 
  return 0; 
 case STAT_ERROR: 
  snmp_perror(sp->peername); 
  return 0; 
 } //switch 







 * function:  void print_new_line( FILE *f) 
 * parameters:  FILE *f - the file in which a new line is to be added  
 * returns:  none 
 * description:  adds a new line to the specified log file. This is being used  
 *    so as to make the parsing of the log files easier. 
 */ 
 










 * function:  void poll(void) 
 * parameters:  none 
 * returns:  none 





 struct host *hp; 
 struct snmp_session ss, *sp; 
 struct oid *op; 
 
 FILE *f; 
 int i; 
 
 for ( i = 0; i<3; i++) { 
  hp = &hosts[i]; 
  //f = fp[i]; 
  if (i==0) f = fopen("a1.log","a"); 
  else if (i==1) f = fopen("a2.log","a"); 
  else f = fopen("t.log","a"); 
 
  snmp_sess_init(&ss);   // initialize session 
  ss.version = SNMP_VERSION_2c; 
  ss.peername = hp->name; 
  ss.community = "public"; 
  ss.community_len = strlen(ss.community); 
  snmp_synch_setup(&ss); 
  if (!(sp = snmp_open(&ss))) { 
   snmp_perror("snmp_open"); 
   continue; 
  } //if 
   
  print_new_line(f); 
 
  if (hp->type == "ATTACKER") op = oids_A;  
  else op = oids_T; 
  for (op; op->Name; op++) { 
   struct snmp_pdu *req, *resp; 
   int status; 
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   req = snmp_pdu_create(SNMP_MSG_GET); 
   snmp_add_null_var(req, op->Oid, op->OidLen); 
   status = snmp_synch_response(sp, req, &resp); 
   if (!log_response(status, sp, resp,f)) break; 
   snmp_free_pdu(resp); 
  } //for 
    snmp_close(sp); 







 * function:  int main (int argc, char *argv[]) 
 * parameters:  argc - no of arguments 
 *    argv[] - an array of pointers to the command line 
 *    parameters  
 * returns:  0 - if executes successfully  
 *    1 - if execution unsuccessful 
 * description:  the main function. Doesn't use any command line  
 *    parameters. 
 */ 
 
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
    int i; 
 initialize(); 
  
 for ( i=1; i<240; i++) { 
       poll(); 
       sleep(POLL_INTERVAL); 
 } 





#!  perl –w 
#   Author: Chandan Singh Negi  
# Description: A short script to reverse the log file to increasing order of time 
# Usage:  perl –w reverse.pl logfilename 
 
my (@array); 
my ($x,$y) = 0; 
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open(IN, "<".$ARGV[0]) || die "Can't open input file\n"; 
open(OUT, ">". $ARGV[1]) || die "Can't open output file\n"; 
 
while(<IN>) { 





for ($y= $x-1; $y >=0; $y--) { 







#!  perl -w 
#   Author:  Chandan Singh Negi 
#   Description: A short script to create multiple log files, one for each mib to  
#   facilitate the forming of RRDs 
# Usage:  perl –w logseparator.pl logfilename 
 
 







open(LOG,"<$file") or die "could not open file"; 
while(<LOG>) { 
 if ($_ !~ /^\n/){ 
  chomp; 
  ($time,$ipadd,$mib_n_value) = split /:/; 
  print "min_n_value = $mib_n_value\n"; 
  ($mib,$count) = split / = /, $mib_n_value; 
  ($f,$m,$l) = split /\./, $mib; 
  print "The value of log file name is $m.log\n"; 
  sleep 1; 
  $array[$no] = $m.".log"; 
  print "The value of $no element in array is $array[$no]\n"; 
  $no++; 
 } 




$max_no_of_mibs = $no; 
print "No. of mibs = $max_no_of_mibs\n"; 
sleep 1; 
 
print "Splitting log files \n"; 
 
for ($x = 1; $x <= $max_no_of_mibs; $x++) { 
# open(OUT."$x", ">". "$x.log") || die "couldn't open $x.log \n"; 
 open(OUT."$x", ">". $array[$x-1]) || die "couldn't open $x.log \n"; 
} 
 
$x = 1; 
open(LOG,"<$file") or die "could not open file"; 
while(<LOG>) { 
 if ($_ !~ /^\n/) { 
  chomp; 
  if ($x > $max_no_of_mibs) { $x = 1; } 
  ($time,$ipadd,$mib_n_value) = split /:/; 
  ($mib,$count) = split / = /, $mib_n_value; 
   
  print "Updating $x.log\n"; 
  $FH = OUT."$x"; 
  print $FH "$time:$count\n"; 





for ($x = 1; $x <= $max_no_of_mibs; $x++) { 




D.  GRAPHER.PL 
 
#!  perl -w 
#   Author: Chandan Singh Negi 
#   Description: A short perl script to create RRDs and Graphs. Uses perl::RRD  
#   modules 










($fname,$fext) = split /\./, $file; 
 
print "The file is $file\n"; 
print "The filename is $fname\n"; 
print "The file extension is $fext\n"; 
 




    ($time,$count) = split /:/; 
 if ($cnt <2) { $start_time = $time-10;} 





print "Creating Round-Robin-Database $fname.rrd \n"; 
 
RRDs::create ($fname.".rrd","--start",$start_time, "--step",5,  
  "DS:a:COUNTER:10:U:U", 
  "RRA:AVERAGE:0.5:1:600"); 
$ERROR = RRDs::error; 
die "$0: unable to create '$fname.'.rrd: $ERROR\n" if $ERROR; 
 
 
print "Updating $fname.rrd\n"; 
 
open(LOG,"<$file") or die "could not open file"; 
while(<LOG>) { 
 chomp; 
 RRDs::update ($fname.".rrd", $_); 
 if ($ERROR = RRDs::error) { 





print " start time = $start_time\n"; 
print " end time = $end_time\n"; 
 
print "Making graphs \n"; 
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#  Change the title name of the graph as desired. 
 
RRDs::graph ("$fname.gif","--start", $start_time, "--end", $end_time,"--
title","TFN_Syn_Flood - Rate of change of $fname with time", 
             "--vertical- label","$fname(/s)", "DEF:mibvalue=$fname.rrd:a:AVERAGE",  
             "LINE1:mibvalue#FF0000:\rAverage change in $fname per second");  
if ($ERROR = RRDs::error) { 
 die "$0: unable to draw graph $fname-AVG.gif: $ERROR\n"; 
}; 
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